Russian Identity

Fundamental to constructivism is the proposition that human beings are social beings, and they are human for social relations. Social relations make or construct people-ourselves-into the kind of beings that we are. We make the world that it is.[2](Onuf, 1998: 59) Constructivism holds that people make society, and society makes people. This is a continuous, two-way process. Social rules make the process by which people and society constitute each other continuous and reciprocal.  Rules make it possible for us to act on behalf of social constructions. Any stable pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended consequences gives society a structure, recognizable as such to any observer.(ibid.: 59) Rules make agents out of individual human beings by giving them opportunities to act upon the world. These acts have material and social consequences, some of them intended and some not.(ibid.: 64) Statements can fully be applied to Russian state. The number of people who live in Russia is very big, therefore, I may say that Russian people as well as Russian ethnicities make up the identity of Russia, as well as society. Russian people have a big say in politics of the state. Every Presidential elections up to 80 percent of people give their vote for a new president of Russia, and show respectfully their partly involvement into the politics of state. People are what makes societies work, and people create their own politics. Social rules as well as rules on behalf of which people behave fully depend on the policies of state, and people are the ones who make this behavior happen. Russia is nowadays a well-structured society, and all the rules applied to people can be recognized as given in a certain structure to a mechanism of rule inside of  society. These  new rules are quite important in a sense that they bring order to a given society, and they are a source to avoid chaos.

Institutions make people into agents and constitute environment within which agents conduct themselves rationally. While it is always possible, we more commonly think of agents as operationing in an institutional context that gives them at least some opportunities for choice. (Onuf; 1998: 61) Institutions such as balance of power, spheres of influence, and treaties are simple because observers can easily pick them out of an institutional environment characterized by a large number of linked rules and related practices. Agents act as observers when they recognize any institutions as such , no matter how complex it is.  Scholars often think of international regimes as something that they are alone can see, while agents can see only the simpler institutions making up the regime. International regimes are hard to see because the rules connecting the institutions that make them up tend to be informal (ibid: 71). International society is heteronomously ruled because states exercise their independence under the principle of sovereignty and under a number of commitment-rules granting them rights and duties with respect to each other. One state’s independence is a limit on every other’s, and all states´ agents accept the unintended  consequences that result from their many individual choices. (ibid.: 77) Rules and given to Russia a constitution – norms, they provide a basis of sovereignty in Russia. Russia acts in the world on behalf of its democratic system and norms and rules in the society.  Anarchy is a condition of rule in which rules are not directly responsible for the way agents conduct their relations.(Onuf; 1998: 63) All arguments work in the modern Russian state.  People in Russian state act on behalf of their needs, and are obliged to follow rules in a society. People recognize institutions, and the interdependence which they find, is fully recognized by them. Russian state is an independent state, and its interaction with other states is fully based on respect of sovereignty. If sovereignty is being broken, one can say that the state is weak. There has been the age of Russian perestroika, when anarchy of power was so much in conflict in politics of Russia and people’s minds. However, this change occurred , and showed its fruitful results in the new evolving Russian democratic state.

Constructivist position on relation of agents to structures is that they each constitute the other. Simultaneously, agents and structure enable and constrain each other. Relation of constructivism to structuration is complex. Constructivism debt to structuration is plain enough, but the origin and nature of the differences are important. Rules are central to this process because they make people active participants  in society, and they give any society its distinctive character (or structure). Rules define agents in terms of structures, and structures in terms of agents. (Gould; 1998: 80) Agents are, or consist of individuals whose acts materially affect the world. Rules constituting a society define the conditions under which individual may intervene in the world. Rules make individuals into agents by enabling them to act upon the world in which they find themselves. These acts have material and social effects; they make the world what is materially and socially.(ibid.: 81) The rules, due to which Russia lives, are the international rules, which can be applied to citizens of Russian state. Russia is following international codes of rules, and applies these rules to the institutions, as well as citizens of Russia. International rules are difficult to follow, and Russia used to have some problems, due to the difference in the codes of justice. People are those who make it all happen.  Citizens are the ones to establish their own rules, and the ones to obey them.

I.2     International Social Structure

Wendt offers the rival claim that state identity is endogenous to structured interaction among states. The structural of state interaction, systemic factors such as interdependence and the transnational convergence of domestic values, and even the manipulation of symbols in the strategic practice of rational agents all contribute to the formation of collective identities.(Gould; 1998: 102) He approaches  that the structures of international  politics constrain state behavior; the second argues that international structures affect both behavior and identity. In our case, it is both, Russian state is influenced by international structures.

Identity is shaped by structural constrains and incentives. Such arguments de-emphasize the ways the behavior of agents within structures shapes identity. It pays less attention than it might to the active role people and nations play in the fabrication of their own political identities.(Gould; 1998: 103) Constructivism holds that social structure, by itself cannot serve as the basis for a complete account of identity. Agents and their behavior must also be considered. Speaking is doing, and constructivists maintain that social meanings, institutions, and structures are constructed out of practical linguistic rules.(Kowert; 1998: 104) Here, one should say that people are the ones to create their own world, and the politicians who make it all happen right. Here, the agents, people, contribute to  state policies by being active agents in Russian society. Therefore, the agents, people create its own ways within certain structures, social and political, which shape identity of Russian state.

State identities are constituted in and through  relation to  global economy. However, state identities are neither fixed nor stable and can only be reproduced through reiterative performances in different terrains. For example, the identity of an internationalist welfare state can be performed through the adoption of particular sets of domestic economic policies as against others (such as emphasizing state planning and the building of a strong public sector as against a set of policies that favors disinvestment by the state). While seemingly distinct, practices in these terrains need to be understood as being part of a larger performance of a particular state identity. (Varadarajan; 2004: 323) Here, we might say that Russia contributes to all before mentioned issues including a global economy, where it has a certain, not the last one position. It is a part of G-8, which decides global problems of the world, such as fight against terrorism and so on. It works on these issues together with some other states, therefore it is a part of a peace economic dialogue. Russia’s state’s economic and political attitude is introduced every Summit of G-8, and it’s state identity, therefore, is showed and not neglected.

Wendt conflates two processes. The constitution of identity in relation to difference does not mean that the constitution of identity necessarily involves the agency and discourse of outsiders, but that it presupposes the existence of alternative identities. A second way in which liberal constructivists downplay the role of difference in identity constitution is by arguing that some state identities, such as democratic, are type identities that involve minimal interaction with ‘others’, and represent characteristics that are ‘intrinsic to the actors’, such that ‘a state can be democratic all by itself ’. In this case, Russia has a big stand in the world politics, and it is an active player. Only ‘role’ identities, such as enemy, friend, or rival are relational and require the existence of an ‘other’ state. While it is true that democracy describes a state’s internal system of rule and all states may become democratic if they fulfill the socially constituted criteria, democracy as an identity is constituted in relation to difference in two senses: first, its existence as an identity presupposes the conceptual possibility of non-democracy. Second, in a world where diverse regimes can claim to be democracies and the representativeness and accountability of democratic regimes are internally questioned, the ‘performance’ of a democratic identity entails the discursive differentiation of the ‘fully’ and ‘truly’ democratic self from the ‘inadequately’ and ‘falsely’ democratic other. (Rumelili; 2004). This exists in Russia’s democracy and state behavior. Russia can be seen to have several identities, especially when the formation of the state took place in 1990s. It had its own type of behavior oriented towards newly emerging states. It saw them partly false democratic. Behavior towards the West was different. However, nowadays, Russian state has emerged as newly democratic. Its behavior is to act upon the norms established in the international system, as well as to preserve its own new democratic state identity. State is forming its own identity in time in the world. Construction of this identity is quite important in the world as well for Russia itself, because due to this identity, Russia is accepted in the world.

International social structure represents relatively stable and regularized  configurations of rules and roles across the international system (or subsystems). Structures are both regulative and constitutive. They provide understandings (particular types of information), incentives, and constraints for certain behavior (thus shaping and shoving action based on a “logic of consequences”), but also help define (“constitute”) the identities and interests of actors and establish behavioral norms (thereby contributing to action based on a “logic of appropriateness” rooted in social roles and rules). Structure is not a static thing, it is a dynamic product of interaction between agents (it is constantly being produced, reproduced, and transformed by social processes).  That said, the more stable a given structure is over time, and the more its components are internalized by agents (that is, treated as “taken for granted” aspects of an “external objective reality”), the more a structure is “institutionalized” and the more resistant it will be to change (i.e., the more it will create “path dependence”). (Rumelili, 2004)  Russian state follows rules and norms in the international system. It also develops its own behavior on the international level. Its structure brings in itself a particular set of norms and rules established by state. State is the structure which helps to provide interaction within the system, and Russian state behaves accordingly to these rules and provides a framework to an institutionalized community. States act on behalf of their interests, and provide consequences of their interests. State preserves its own democratic state identity, and as a result, state establishes its certain position on the state level.   

In sum, for Constructivists, agents and structures are co-determined or “mutually constituted.” Structures emerge from the interactions between agents at time “t”, but structures also shape who agents are and what forms their future interactions will take at time. Thus, according to Constructivist ontology, agents and structures are always in a process of becoming[3]. We can notice the interaction between structures and agents, however, is the basis in interaction put on the level of state rules and state politics. In case of Russia, people are the ones to choose politicians, and they, therefore are the ones  to follow national and international  rules and norms. The process of making of  state identity is, therefore, a result of this interactions, as well as in the making on the international basis and world system’s development.

I.3.     Constructivism and World Politics

Constructivism is agnostic about change in world politics. It restores much variety and difference to world affairs and points out the practices by which intersubjective order is maintained, but it does not offer any more hope for change in world politics than neorealism. Constructivist’s insight that anarchy is what states make of it, for example, implies that there are many different understandings of anarchy in the world, and so state actions should be more varied than only self-help. But this is an observation of already-existing reality, or, more precisely, a set of hypotheses about the same. These different understandings of anarchy are still rooted in social structures, maintained by the power of practice, and quite impervious to change. What constructivism does offer is an account of how and where change may occur.(Hopf, 1998)

One aspect of constructivist power is the power to reproduce, discipline, and police. Alternative actors with alternative identities, practices, and sufficient material resources are theoretically capable of effecting change. Contrary to some critics who assert that constructivism believes that change in world politics is easy, that "bad" neorealist structures need only be thought away, in fact constructivism appreciates the power of structure, if for no other reason then it assumes that actors reproduce daily their own constraints through ordinary practice. Constructivist’s conceptualization of the relationship between agency and structure grounds its view that social change is both possible and difficult. Neorealism's position that all states are meaningfully identical denies a fair amount of possible change to its theoretical structure. (Hopf, 1998)

In sum, neorealism and constructivism share fundamental concerns with the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behavior, the definition of state interests, the nature of power, and the prospects for change. They disagree fundamentally, however, on each concern. Contra neorealism, constructivism assumes that actors and structures mutually constitute each other; anarchy must be interpreted to have meaning; state interests are part of the process of identity construction; power is both material and discursive; and change in world politics is both possible and difficult.(Hopf; 1998)   It’s a natural process of every state to change it’s system in time, anarchy in Russian state is seen as a relief from stagnation, state practices power, and state is the one to follow the change in internal  life of the state. State, therefore, reproduces its nature and rule. In Russian state, actors have practically made change to happen, and brought visible change to its structure. Anarchy must be interpreted, in Russian state, to have meaning and bringing certain results in the process of identity  and state construction. Power, in our case, is discursive, and change is historically possible, but difficult.

I.4.     Identities and interests

Maja Zehfuss tells that it is the intersubjective, rather than material aspect of structures which influences behavior. Intersubjective structures are constituted by collective meanings. Actors acquire identities, which Wendt defines as ‘relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self’ (Wendt, 1992: 397; see also Wendt, 1999: 21), by participating in collective meanings. Identity is ‘a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions’ (Wendt, 1999: 224). Thus identities are significant because they provide basis for interests. Identities are basis for interests and therefore more fundamental (Wendt, 1999: 231). Crucially, conceptions of self and other, and consequently security interests, develop only in interaction (Wendt, 1992: 401; Wendt, 1999: 36).

Identities and interests are not only created in such interactions, they are also sustained that way (Wendt, 1999: 331). Through repeated interactive processes stable identities and expectations about each other are developed. Thereby actors create and maintain social structures (Wendt, 1992: 405), which subsequently constrain choices. Once structures of identity and interests have been created they are not easy to transform because the social system becomes an objective social fact to the actors. Actors may have a stake in maintaining stable identities (Wendt, 1992: 411), due to external factors such as the incentives induced by established institutions and internal constraints such as commitment to established identities (Wendt, 1999: 339).

I should approve the fact that  identities are basis for interests, and also a fundamental value. They are develop in interaction between states, between institutions and they are significantly approved to be a fundamental value when the issue of interaction arose. State produces its values, and significantly bases their interaction on the the interests of a particular state, or states, and continues this development and interaction in time, making formation of states a significant value and a process, connecting to which, one relies on the existing framework of identities and behaviors of  state. In case of Russian state, its external identity is being viewed as something dangerous in time, and which significantly slowed down its processes of interaction between states. Nowadays, when Russian state’s identity has been changed, Russian state approves to be more open to interactions, however, foreign states, relying on state behavior  produce a framework of interaction with Russian state. Maintaining stable identities is difficult due to external factors, and the behaviors of state leads to identity change, is another paragraph from Wendt.  Identity in Russia is being transformed inside of the countries due to internal political processes, however, on the international arena, the state identity is being transformed, and Russia doesn’t have a big value, if it doesn’t change its policies oriented towards foreign states, in the behaviors of institutions, and political practices. Any change is seen in the world politics as something new and destructive, therefore, Russia is obliged to follow international rules to make peace in the country, and fruitful development of its external and internal interactions.

Actors have several social identities but only one corporate identity. Social identities can exist only in relation to others and thus provide a crucial connection for the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures. This type of identity is continuously redefined in processes of interaction.  One of the concrete mechanisms of identity transformation which Wendt considers is based on conscious efforts to change identity. As the new behavior affects the partner in interaction, this involves getting them to behave in a new way as well. This process is not just about changing behavior but about changing identity. However, behavior is construed as the key to identity change. The interaction Wendt describes is all about physical gestures. An advance, a retreat, a brandishing of arms, a laying down of arms or an attack are the examples Wendt gives for a gesture (Wendt, 1992: 404;  Wendt, 1999: 326–35).

Moreover, there is a problem of disentangling identity and behavior because Wendt claims that it is not just behavior but identity that changes. Yet it is unclear, with respect to an actual case such as the one considered here, what exactly sets apart identity transformation from a mere change in behavior. Although Wendt’s claim that the way in which others treat an seems plausible, it is hard to pin down the qualitative difference between the two. After all, in his approach we are forced to infer actors’ self-understanding from nothing but their behavior. If an identity matters only in its realization in certain types of behavior, then it is difficult to see what should justify calling it ‘identity’ rather than ‘behavior’. The idea that identities are relatively stable is certainly of no help as the possibility of identity transformation, of moving from one kind of anarchy to another, is crucial. Identity change is merely about shifting from one relatively stable identity to another.[4](Wendt; 1999). The change of the identity of Russian state occurred in the 1990s, and a new identity is the way Russia behaves nowadays, and the way the world sees it with own eyes a new Russia state. State identity transformation is quite a stable process, however, for Russian state it was painful.

I.5.    National Identity

There is no doubt that nations are historical constructs. They are results of a special European movement and some active nation building elite. Phrases like “the invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) underline this fact. At the same time, nationalist movements have been trying to establish and argue that there is a history, a culture and a tradition from which the nations derive. This ambiguity can also be found in the theorizing of nationalism. The question is to what extent are the nations rooted in a historical and cultural base, or whether these links are merely created by the nation builders.

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