Russian Identity

Anthony Smith’s (1983, 1991) theories of nationalism are based on a so-called ethnie, which denotes the “core” of a nation. This perception of a common name, ancestry, culture, history and homeland, together with some sort of solidarity, is a necessary condition for a nation according to Smith. From this point of view, Russia nation is based on culture of different ethnics, and these ethnics make a core of a nation. They share the same homeland, Russia. I would propose that many ethnics throughout history made a fundament on which Russian state exists now, however, they had nothing in common, and it has made Russian ethnical background more strong and more diverse. It is a basis for every state formation to absorb in its territory the number of people with ethnic principles, and therefore, to bring people into one nation. From this perspective, Russian state is a multiethnic state with common national identity and identity of Russian people.

Benedict Anderson’s (1991) theory is superior to Smith’s, especially “on the workings of an existing community”, because it is concerned with identity as a process. It is not restricted to one special historical happening (the rise of nations), but it tries to give a more general picture of how a group of people continuously experiences its common identity. His expression “imagined communities” underlies one important feature, namely the on-going process. People have to imagine a community, a society, or a common identity, for it to be real. It does not exist unless people think so, unless they feel some sort of solidarity with people they never have met.

In Christopher J. Ullock’s (1996) words, Anderson’s approach is based on “a metaphysics of becoming” (as opposed to a “metaphysics of being”), something that makes his theory dynamic. It focuses on the process of identity formations and is not limited to its historical origins. This makes the theory more generally applicable, both to kinds of collective identities other than states and to nationalist movements outside Europe which have a totally different historical background.

Russian national identity is based on the hundreds years of history. Historically, it was based on some values, which don’t go in contradiction with before– mentioned principles, for example, with a view that nations are historical constructs, or that nation has a core. This core is a stable value, and it significantly reflects the state fundamental principles,  as well as it significantly reflects nation- state structure, which is mainly developed due to historical processes inside of the country. Nowadays, national identity in Russia is a matter of discourses and analysis. Politicians have their own view on national idea of state. People follow common thinking, or the ideology of state, or, nowadays, its basic values, which reflect specifics of Russian state which is different from the rest of the states. However, national identity is a matter, a fundament of state identity, and its core is in the attitudes, ideology, behavior of state, etc. which people construct themselves, and which state follows historically, or basing its behavior on international rules and norms. National idea is a matter of disputes, and its value is to understand Russia as a state, as an entity, as a certain state with specific mentality. National identity is based on these factors, on the core, on history and ideology, and people are the ones who decide about the idea of state and its national identity. In consideration to international practices, Russian state is being viewed as a national power, which certainly is a result of state practices in time.

I.6.      Identity as Process

Identity is not something that just is; it can rather be described as a process. Collective identities are never stable and objective but always in-the-making. They are subjectively experienced and expressed, a result of social communication and perceptions of Self and Others. A basic insight in all identity theory is the importance of the Other. As a problem in my work, I significantly highlight the issue of identity formation as a process in time, as well as it is a matter of interaction between agents and their attitudes. Their attitudes are expressed in the behavior of states. It is a source of communication of states and their interests. As for the Other, I mention that Russian state is shaped in politics by the behavior of other states. 

This is a classic insight from Fredrik Barth (1969:10) who argued that ethnic identities were a result of communication with other groups: “...ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built.” Identities are always a result of communication; they are relational. Those who do not fit into the definitions of the Self are different and may also be excluded, estranged or alienated. They may even be securitized and become enemies. This way the securitization also functions as an identity building process. The Others are securitized because they are considered to represent symbols and values that are incommensurable or threatening to those of the Self-group. This approach does not neglect historical traits (like language, culture and so on). But as long as these have to be interpreted and represented through subjects and through subjective experiences and language, they are subjective social constructs.  Here, the most important is the meaning of the Other and state identity. Communication on this level bring in itself the matters of  social constructions and interests. States due to their interests are having their interests to act on behalf of them. States are important agents in protecting their identities.

To conclude before-mentioned issues in the work, I will introduce you to my view on Russian identity in the context of constructionists. The main accent is made on state identity formation, and reflects, at some points, issues, which were previously discussed in theoretical part of the work, and which conclude my own ideas on the work, and which give a feedback to the second part of the work in which I will discuss the opinions of Russia and Western scholars, and Russian politicians, which show different opinions on how the identity of Russia is constructed, what are the main priorities in the identity of Russian state, and which show different views on how Russia is being made throughout history and nowadays.

I.7.      Concluding theories

National  identity as part of Russian identity is a basis of construction of Russian state. Without ideology of state construction, without orientation on the international jurisdictional norms, without its self-definition in the world arena, without connection with the system factors of civilization, without definition of principles and priorities of the state formation there cannot be self-definition of Russia as state, and therefore, its definition of identity. Formation, or construction, of identity depends on the maturity of society, its ideology and social consciousness of the nation. State as political organization of the society has several factors: existence of the system of institutions, as well as institutions, which make functions of governmental power, law, which strengthens defined system of norms, defined territory, on which the existing system of norms is spread. However, the institution of state-building  is based on the values, which define the identity of nation.

The main values of Russian state is considered to be its history, culture, national language, and Orthodoxy. On the basis of historical development, the identity of Russia is built. By the formation of consciousness of nation, by creation of ideology, the ideological identity of Russia is being made. Formation of the identity of nation can be seen in the context of historical development of state.

If we look on the identity as a process, through which the state is being formed, we should look on the processes inside of the country. These are the changing nature of political and economical institutions, which gain its development in quickly changing nature of state, its policies oriented on the formation of state as an entity, etc. On the world arena, these factors are a multipolarity of political world, quickly changing world system, integration processes, communicability. These factors which influence the identity of Russia.

Identity of Russia was for most part is formed by Russian intelligentsia. Trustful relationship of intelligentsia as part of a society has build up people of different epochs of Russian historical development. Culture, as historically defined factor of development of nation, has gained its development in spiritual values of Russian state. That’s why, wide entity of Russia is by many means defines the identity of nation, as well as proved its value in the creation of Russian identity in the process of historical development of nation. This process is changing, developing and dynamic. Besides, the factors such as economical and political institutions which change its nature in the process of state formation can be said to promote the process of construction of state identity.

Religion, as one of the forms of social consciousness, and spiritual values, form the identity of a nation, as well as it influences the process of the identity formation. Russia is a multiconfessional state, however, one of the forms of religious consciousness is being an Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodoxy has difficult history. Officially, the Church is separated from the state. Nevertheless, spiritual values and social consciousness of part of a nation is formed under the influence of Orthodoxy, which  reflects in the identity of Russia.

Identity, as a final result of state formation, self-definition of state, is important for perceptance of Russian state on the international level. Contacts, and intercommunication with the state is fully dependent on  state identity.

Identity is at first, is formed inside of the country. However, in the last decade, there arose a tendency of influence of the other countries on the identity of the nation. For example, on the identity of Russia the post-Soviet countries are being influenced, as well as there can be notice an influence of such states as European states, USA, China, India, Japan. Russia tries to influence political formation of post- Soviet states, builds new forms of economical networks and structures. This all influence politics in Russia, and builds Russian identity.

Russia, as a part of world institutions, the UN, etc., is in the active international political life. Therefore, Russia is a part of international law. It follows the norms of international justice, and builds its relations with the EU, on the basis of international justice, and codes of jurisprudence. The basis of this cooperation is international relations, international jurisdictional norms and treaties. Regulation of relations between states is being made due to special norms, approved in treaties, which can be changed, but which fully depend on the dynamics of the processes and regulations. New norms, and changing world influences Russian identity, as state. It is formed inside of the state, and also on the basis of international law and legal basis of international relations.

Chapter II. Views on identity of Russia

II.1. View on history of Russian Identity by Iver B. Neumann

To have a closer look on the history of Russia, I will introduce you to the book of  Iver B. Neumann, “Russia and the Idea of Europe”, 1996. He gives a summary of historical formation of Russian identity from the 18th century up until the end of Perestroika and overview of the views of famous historians and politicians. Neumann stresses that formation of Russian identity was formed throughout the history of Russia with close comparison between European identity,  European institutions, culture and interactions between European and Russian states.

Identity of Russia has been formed  during all the historical process. According to Neumann, Russia has been trying to relate itself to Europe from the 18 century, but “different perceptions of Europe made it impossible to forge a common Russian identity… Some looked to the East, others to the West” (Neumann, 1996:10). This contradiction exist nowadays, as there is no final decision of where does Russia belong? Ones would say that it is a part of Europe, another would say that because of geographical reasons, it doesn’t fully belong to Europe, because the main part of the country is in Asia. Some would say that it is Eurasia.

Russia has been developed a lot in the 18th century. It has become a strong European power during the rule of Peter the Great. The identity became stronger and clearer, as the contacts with Europe intensified and Russia has become more opened. From that time, it can be said that Russia has put an eye on Europe in terms of development, technologies, economy and politics. Then, it has received a lot of attention from Europe. Then, it has been a strong and powerful European power in terms of trade, etc. Its identity was a strong economic and political power. It was said that Russia belongs to Europe, and new forms of relations were created then. This identity was so strong as it could stand together with Europe for many years to come.

At the same time, the idea of using Urals as a border line to separate its European and Asian parts was proposed by geographer and the first significant Russian historian Vasily N. Tatishev in 1730s (Neumann 1996:12). Up until now, Russia has a separation to European and Asian parts geographically, demographically and economically.

From the beginning of the 19th century, thinkers and officials like Karamzin, Speransky and others look to Europe for ideas to improve Russian political order. Karamzin, another great Russian historian, argued that they are actually weakening Russia, since it is dangerous to tamper with ancient political structures. At the same time, Karamzin saw Russian uniqueness and isolation as something positive. He saw a specific character of  Russian state (Neumann 1996, 15).

In 1830s the change of positions happened in the political space. Romantic nationalists gathered under the banner of  “Slavophilism”, and those who looked to Europe for political and economic models become known as Westernisers (ibid: 29). The task of Westernisers had set themselves was to show how Russia was already developing along European lines and how it should try to accelerate that development (ibid:35). Slavophiles saw the contemporary Russian state as an extension of this alien principle into the organic body of the Russian nation. European influence to them was Otherness from which Russia must be saved (ibid:33). The official ideology was represented by minister Uvarov, who proclaimed what was to become known as the doctrine of “official nationality”. The three pillars which were to define official Russia were autocracy (samoderzhavie), Orthodox religion (pravoslavie) and nationality or nation-mindedness (narodnost`) (ibid: 25).

This contradiction between Slavophiles and Westernisers was of great importance and great meaning as for it was a way to see Russia so different already then, when it was choosing it’s own way to go. This argument had deep roots in history and in common understanding by people and theoreticians. Some saw it as a European power, the others as a great Russian power. This contradiction has its continuum nowadays, as for people see Russia differently.

During the First World War the question of the relative importance of national and class identities became important, as well as interdependence of Russia with Western Europe. Even between the members of the same political party, for example Bolsheviks, there was no a common point of view on the question: where Trotsky holds that the idea of a Fatherland has no appeal to the European proletariat, Bukharin acknowledges it as a potent force and Lenin stresses the importance of a nation-state (Neumann 1996).

To understand that this new change after the October revolution 1917 in Russia was destructive is to understand the history of Russia then. The Soviet Republic was said to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states, and to keep good contacts with Europe, still Russia lacked its own position, and lost many of its contacts. Europe became suspicious of Russia, of a country which lost some part of its strong identity. It hasn’t get the one in the years to come. It was a new Russia, called Soviet Union,  for some seventy years. An attempt to reborn Russian identity in contradiction to Soviet identity was made in 1990s by wide anti-communist opposition including democrats, nationalists and former Soviet officials like Yeltsin, and was made successfully.

After the Second World War, state identities of the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United States, each rooted in domestic socio-cultural milieus, produced understandings of one another based on differences in identity and practice. The United States balanced against Russia because of the latter’s communist identity. The United States understood the Soviet threat, as communist, and itself as the anticommunist protector (Hopf, 1998:180). Self-identity of the Soviet Union then was defined as a fighter against imperialism, leaded by the United States. Both states had nuclear weapons and strong political power. The context to understand Russia after the Second World War has changed dramatically. It became so different from what it was. The Soviet Union has become a superpower, and an identity of Russia was seen from that perspective. Identity of Russia was formed from its victory in the war, and has put an impact on the self-definition of the state.

In the beginning of 1980s, A. Solzhenitsyn wrote that Russia is morally superior to West European nations, and everybody is responsible for everything, everywhere. Academician D. S. Likhachev concludes that patriotism is indeed a necessity, since “ we are all citizens of our people, citizens of our great Union and citizens of the Earth” (Neumann 1996:147). Again, this period can be marked as a revaluation of values in the Soviet state, of what Russia is and what it will be. These were an attempts to recover a liberal position of Russia in the world. These liberal views specified in context of the direct assessment of the Western liberal intelligentsia. The Westernisation of Russia was proposed later by Sakharov, and a cooperation with Europe was proposed by Likhachev. Neumann comments this, as the Russia’s position on the West has changed, as well as on the capitalist system. The public political space has enlargened, and the Russian debate about Europe with dynamism has reappeared (Neumann 1996:157).

Later on, the relations with Europe were characterised as isolationist. It was stated by Novikov. And there was a need to re-impose them. Novikov came up with the slogan of “Eurasia”. Europe and Russian Westernisers again tried to Europeanise Russia (Neumann 1996: 177). Russia which we see nowadays is heading towards Europeanization, and Europe which we see nowadays is highly interested in Russia-European relations.

II.2.      Historical formation of Russian identity

II.2.1.   The view of Russian scholars

Identity was formed both internally by the consolidation of religion, the church, and eventually by a single Muscovite state (from roughly the fifteenth century), and at the frontiers in the struggles with peoples seen to be different. From its beginning, then, Russian identity was bound up with the supranational world of belief, the political world loosely defined by the ruling dynasty, and was contrasted to “others” at the periphery. Religion served in those pre- and early-modern times much as ethnicity does today. Agadjanian says that if not from the very beginning, then in the next few centuries Russian identity became closely tied with religion, a shifting, expanding territory, and the state.[5]

Nicholas V.Riasanovsky in his book “Russian Identities. A Historical Survey” says that in Kievan Russia the political system was certainly pluralistic and to an extent even populist and democratic (Riasanovsky 2005 :19), that the conversion of the Rus of the Greek form of Christianity brought with it the highly developed Byzantine culture, that the new Church was one of the entire state, and at least after 1037, it was subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople and headed by a metropolitan of Kiev, although Novgorod and some other town also became religious centers. The Kievan state was the state of the East Slavs. It was also a European state. Christian identity of Kievan Russia and Kievan Russians was of course fully explicit. From the victorious and glorious account of the conversion of the Rus in the Primary Chronicle, Christianity stood out as the truth, the right, and the one sure guide for Russia and the Russian people. (ibid.:22) Russian identity during some hundred years between the decline and fall of the Kievan state and the accession to the throne of Peter the Great survived many things, but Orthodox Christianity remained basic to the Russian identity, not unlike Roman Catholicism in medieval Western and Central Europe (ibid.: 49-50). In Medieval Russia, as in medieval Europe as a whole, intellectual life centered on religious problems, although their ramifications often encompassed other areas of human activity. (ibid. : 53) The Reign of Peter that Great was significant because of the engagement of Muscovy with Sweden, Poland and Turkey. Russia created an impressive navy. Peter the Great changed the government institutions and th entire administrative apparatus of Muscovite Russia. Intellectual climate constituted the leading inspiration of the age. (ibid. : 76) The identity prevailed significantly and constituted Russia as a significant European state. During the Reign of Nicholas I, 1825-1855, the issue of Russian identity was again on the surface. Russia experienced two intellectual transformations, the change from the ideology of the Age of Reason, to Romanticism and Idealism, and the disintegration of the new worldview. (ibid. : 165)

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